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The Commission's proposed AnnuaL Economic Report for 1982-83 is
submjtted to the Comnrunity institutions in accordance !Jith the CounciLrs
i974 Decision (1) for attainment of a high degree of convergence of econo-
m'ic poL'icies of Member states. The counci L is required in the f ourth
quarter *f each year - on proposaL of the Commissjon and after consuLtjng
ParLjament and the Economic and sociaL committee - to adopt an annuaL
report on the economic situation in the Community and to set eeonomic
*o;.icy Suidetines to be foILowed by each Flember State.
As'!n previous years the Commission has aLso prepared, as a
separate background document to the AnnuaL Economic Report, an AnnuaI Fco-
nomic Review which contains a more detaiLed factuaL anaLysis of economjc
trends and the outLook for the year ahead. This second document is sub-
mitted to the CounciL, ParLiament and Economic and SociaL Commjttee for
i nformat i on.
(1) ArticLe 4 of Decision
sion 75/787lEEC of 18
74l12OlEEC of 18 February 1974, amended by Deci-
December 1975.
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PART I. The Comqqglty_Ec_o.nlpz
1. Shcrt -term lf e q-a-s*Clg_g. o 
" 
pg.c tS.
1.1 1982: DisinfLation and stagnation
The ,",:covery 
',"lhich was forecast f or the seeond haLf of '1t8,? i,::t
spring has ri,:i mater-iaLised. The positive factors jn the i.ast haLf of 1V81t
uh'i ch appe'*.':d tc be po-inting to an upswing, blere reversed in'lhe {'jr:rt
hal-f sf 1pS?" The LikeLy outcome for 1982 is noH approx'imate stagiretion
with a rise in the vslume of output in the Community of only 0r3 %" This
cornpares wjth a forecast of 2 X grouth contained in Last yearts Annu:al
Report (see Table 1) as L.reLt as in most nationaL and internatjonai
f orecasts.
However, mone recent Communications of the Commission to the Coun-
ciL and European CounciL have repeatedLy warned that varjous factors and jn
particuLar the extremeLy high LeveL and voLatiLity of worLd'interest rates,
heavity infLuenced by those of the United States, rjsked creating an econo-
nr.ic envircnment in uhich the expected cycLicaI recovery jn frurope couLd be
aborted- r'hjs seems nor to have occurred in the first half of 1982, both in
Eulopg and other regions of the worLd - especiaLLy those which *ere jn
f',.igiriy pxposed internationat indebtedness situations. ReaL short'term
interest rates remaine!'in the United States and Euro-dollar markets at
near to 5 i( fon much of the tweLve months to the s,:rjng of i9B2 in spite of
the continu'ing recession in the QECD area as a whole" This and ihe Eeneral-
;Limate of Uncertainty and pessimism may have darnpened the normaL dynaniics
-of the bus'iness cycLe. So many enterprises have been caught in unexpectedl"y
diflicuLt financiaL situations, that they ncw need a Lot of convjncing that
Ic:er irlterest rates are a durabte prospect, before taking positive invesl-
ment, stock-bu.i Lding and employment decis'ions on that basis.
t
3.-
Inftation has deceterated somewhat faster than expected. Despite
the cont'inued depreciation of the ECU against the doLLar during the first
haLf of 1982, the Comm.rnityrs irnport prices are L'ikeLy to have deceterated
by more than forecast a year agoi their rise in 1982 is now estimated at
9rz /. (4r7 % in 1981). DoLLar commodity prices, incLuding oi L prices, have
reacted even more strong[y over the tast tweLve months to the combined
'infLuence of exchange-rate movements, high reaL interest rates and weak
demand conditions. The Commun'ity has thus profited from an appreciation.in
its terms of trade in 1982 n15 7"r, after the Large deterioratjons
registered in 1980 and 1981.
Unit labour costs in the Community are tike[y to have dece[erated
qujte significantLy in 198?, increasing by 8r5 Z (in natjonaL currencjes)
as against 1OtO y. in 1981. Together uith the stowdown in inport prices, and
desp'ite a rise in indirect taxes per unit of output, this may have aL[owed
a sL'ight restoration of profit margins together trith some reduction of
infLation. At the [evet of consumer prices, the rate of infLation in 1982
is Likely to be 10r5 I as against 1'lr8 /" in 1981.
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Some Limited progress is being made in 1982 in the struggle aga'inst
infLation, but uneflpLoyment has continued to increase sharpLy, and there is
no sign that this nate of increase wiLL slow down this year. 0n average for
1982 the number of unenpLoyed could reach 11 miLLion <9r4 7, of the Labour
force) and uiLL be higher than that by the end of the year. These develop-
ments result both from a faLL in employment (probabLy by about 1r1 %) and a
continued rise in the Labour force (nearLy 1 iO.
The Comnrn'ityrs current account deficit is Likety to faLL sLightLy
from USD 2018 thousand miLLion (Or8'A of GDP) in 1981 to just over USD
15 thousand miLLion in1982. Thus the overaLL deficit is notr quite smaLL,
but there are serious inbatances in individuaL countries.
As regards poLicy indicators it now seems Likely that money supply
in the Community as a whote wi[[ have groh,n by about 1O.8 t through 1982, a
rate rather higher than the 10 Z forecast jn Last yearrs AnnuaL Report.
The Likely 1982 rate of increase HouLd thus be almost the same as the 1981
rate after three previous years of deceLeration.
As regards budget deficits, beLow-trend growth in most ltlember Sta-
tes in 19BZ Led to a shortfall in tax revenues and an increase in
unempLoyment benefits. In addition, debt service costs have been
increasing rapidLy.0ffsetting measures have been taken jn most ltlember Sta-
tes; for the Comrntrnity as a whoLe the budget defjcit as a percentage of G0P
is L'ikely to remain cLose to 5 % in 1982, as in 1981. The divengence among
Plember States in respect of budget deficits, after increasing sharp[y in
1981, wiLL probably have been reduced somewhat in 198?.
lllithin the European llonetary System there have been two
reaLignments, in February and June of 1982, since the Last AnnuaL Report
was pubLished. As a resuLt of them, variabiLity of exchange rates among the
countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS wiLt have
increased in 1982 (see Table 2).
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NonetheLess, the reaLignments and the internaL poLicy measures
which hrere pLanned to acconpany them, again "confirmed the abiLity of the
system to make orderLy adjustments in accordance with fundamentaL economic
criteriat uhite preventing erratic or irrationaL exchange rate movements"
(AnnuaL Economic Report, 1981-82, p.10).
These reaLignments refLected the insufficient fundamentaL con-
vergence noted in the last Annuat Report. The poLicy measures taken or
announced by BeLgium, France and ItaLy in conjunction with the El{S reaLign-
ments in 198? shou[d, if carried through, improve this situation. Indeed,
one of the most positive deveLopments in the Communityrs system of coor-
dination jn the past year has been the tendency for participants in the EMS
to prepare more adequate accofipanying measures to secure successfuL
exchange rate adjustments,
1.2 Prospects for 1983
The forecast for 1983 suggests that the trend of output growth jn
the Community is Likely to remain very weak.
Output in 1983 is expected to grow by 1r'l X in the Community, wh'ich
supposes some upturn in the second hatf of 1983, The annuaL report Last
year expected domestic demand to rise in 1982 after the sharp increase'in
exports of 1981. Exports in fact held up weLL through 1981 but with
increasing financiaL constrajnts on OPEC and the LDCs and further stagna-
tjon on 0ECD countries in 1982, worLd trade in voLume tenms decLined. This
decLine hlas folLoued by a renered ueakening in domestic demand in the Com-
mu ni ty.
The Low growth forecast for 1983 is based on the ant'icipation that
botlr private consumption and investment r+iLL pick up the course of 1983
under the jnfLuence of Lower infLat'ion and faLLing interest rates. Invest-
ment is forecast to grow by O16 i4 in 1983. This grouth rate assumes some
reductjon in European interest rates and an improvernent jn the profitabi-
Lity of the business sector. Demand is aLso LikeLy to be supported by
Limited restocking acEivity after destocking of the second haLf of 198?.
8"-
ilith some GDP growth in the u"s.A" (7rA'A in 11183), irr spite of
corrtinuing Low inport voLumes in OPEC and l-DCs, worLd trade shouLd recover
,,oinewhat in 1983 Q"?. 7,) but it is unLikeLlr that the foneign sector l'ri LL
,r:iake afl ifilpoftant contribution to growth in the Cotnmun'i'ty, Ho*ever the
t-errns of trade are LikeLy to shring funther to the advantage of the Com-
nuniiyn ilith the current account be'ing roughLy in baLance, At the rr€itionaL
Level- however a very diffu.rent'iated pieture appears with curren't acctlunt
:urpLuses in Germany and Lhe NetherLands, and deficjts in Francer ItaLy and
severaL smaLLer countries"
InfLation js expected to faLL faster in 1983 than was anticipated
earLjer this year" The private consumption defLator is forecast to rise by
only 8r8 X in 1985. This refLects some moderation in inport prices and
Lower internaL cost deveLopments in some countries, notabLy Germany, the
Un'ited Kingdom and the NetherLands, In France too infLation is LikeLy to be
Lower in 19E3 than had been previousLy forecast"
The Louer than expected GDP grohrth
budEet deficits. tlith measures being taken
L'imit the rise, the outcome may on average
tage of GDP.
1983 wi L L tend to ra'ise
severaL member states to
near stabiLity as a percen-
tn
by
be
UnenpLoyment is LikeLy to rise through into the second haLf of 1983
to reach weLL over 12 mjLLions. This results from a further sLight faLL in
empLoyment and a continuation in the increase in the Labour suppty rhich
has characterised recent years"
These sharpLy rev'ised estimates and forecasts for 1982 and 1983
means that the European economy is now (in autumn 198D seen as having
entered a second downward phase in a double-dip recess'ion. The beginnings
of a recovery phase which uere in evidence towards the end of last year
have now cLearLy been extinguished. The recession wiLL in a few months time
be moving'i nto its fotrrth year" The proximate causes o{' this extrerneLy gra-
ve result may be traced to the superimposition of the 1981-82 interest rate
probLem on top of the 1979-80 oiL shock. But to this must be added a deeper
assessment of the structuraL vuLnerabiLjty of the European and worLd eco-
norny that has evidentLy been buiLding up over the past years, and urhich
forms the background to the outLook for the reighties.
9,*
2. Assessment of the ogtLook fol the reightie:
The possibiLity that the European economy is entering a Lon3 period
of sLow growth" or even depression. nay be founded on two broad Lines of
concern.One focusses on the occunrence of externaL accidents or system
shocks, such as oiL shocks, major d'istunbances in t^torLd financiaL market,
or geopoLit'icaL confLicts. A second focusses on the accumutated back-log of
adjustments and on our grotring incapacity to respond quickLy to the recent
changes in the economic environment. The increased structuraI rigidities 'in
our economies and sociaL behaviour have changed profoundLy the Long-term
dynamics of the business cycLe.
Both types of risks are present in the actual situation" Irr a
high Ly interdependent worLd the jrmact of unexpected d jsturbances are com-
municated extremeLy rapidLy, and transLated into negative muLtipLier
effects on nationaL economies (this is particuLarty true of the Comnrunity
economies, be'ing more dependent on externaL trade and more open than the
other ma jor industriaLised countries), It js the roLe of econ'lmjc pol'icy
coordination in the industriaLised worLd to minimise these risks in the
management of nationaL poLic'ies, but recent experience is not so reassuring
in this regard.
The shocks and accidents are by their very nature unpredictabLe,
but this js not a reason for neglecting opportunities to take out compre-
hensive Long-run tinsurance poL'iciest even and forernost at a European
L eve L.
The buiLd up of energy independence - be it through nuclear
programmes or price poLicy for energy products - to avoid the chances of a
th'ird oiL shock is a first and most iflportant exampl-e. Action aLon$ these
Lines proved .in the event insuf f "ic'ient af ter the f irst oi L shock, qnd thq.
recent deferraL of major energy projects jn some parts of the
industriaLjsed worLd invites the quest'ion whether the same mistake is being
repeated.
Current diffi;uLties in 'lnternationaL debt situaticn; si',oui
great the need is f or adequate ,-ident jaL arrangements in the wcrLd
banking system, bearing in mincl .ile spectacuLar growth of sovereign
For Europe there are speciaL con*rrns that arise from its Location
h iiit
r i sks.
as linst
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to much of the wortdrs xeno-currency market, which it cannot fuLLy control
due to the very substantial- fraction of the money and bonds banked or
traded in Europe being denominated in non-European currencies.
There are severaL poss'ibLe roads into Long-run stagnation that do
not reLy on'accidents'. Attention has been concentrated on the ebb and
fLow of t'ides of technoLogical innovation and product devetopment' At the
uorLd11ide LeveL new braves of products and processes seem indeed to be
constantLy forthcoming. However Europe is Lagging behind in severaL fieLds,
due in part to the insuffjcient unity of the Large European market, as welL
as the maintenance of protective devices and subsidies at the nationaL
Leve L.
The rjsk of stagnation has in recent years been characterised by
growing rigidities and greater diffjcuLties in adapting sufficientLy
systems of aids to the economy and of sociat protection, and in haLting the
ueakening of investment and profitabiLity. t{any countries have Lost controL
of their financiaL poLicyr ?LLowing pubLic expenditure to rise and without
adequate mastery of taxation, deficits and monetary expansion.
bJhi Le there 'is recognition of the need to f ace these structurat
maLaises, there is no undisputed preference for a particuLar strategy. At
present one can djscern three mainstream positions in pubLic debate:
first, the viebr that provided rigorous financiat and adjustment poLicies
are persevered uith, a spontaneous irprovement in reat economic perfor-
mance wiLL be forthcomingt aLthough the time-Lags are uncertain and pro-
babLy quite Long;
secondLy, the view that, whiLe rigorous financiaL and adjustment poLi-
cjes are necessary to avoid reexcjtr'ng infLationary expectations, they
risk be'ing insufficient to induce a spontaneous recovery, and that
therefore some policy actions shoutd support economic activity in the
macroeconomi c and structuraL domains;
11.-
- and thirdly" the view that the economy has entered a period of prolonged
quas'i-stagnat'ion i n output, that an essentiaL poLi cy task i s now to
adapt to this reaLity in order to reduce disruptions and inequaLities
deriving from it.
None of these approaches - reLiance on spontaneous recovery, the
support of activity by macroeconomic and structuraL measures, and managed
sLor growth - wilL aLone be sufficient to overcome the preent difficu[ties.
The poLicy framework that is suggested betor is based on the idea that to
bring about a Lasting irnprovement of the economic situatjon in the Com-
munity, what is requ'ired is a divers'ified set of actions, that vary not
onLy according to di f f erences in country situat'ions, but aLso draw on aLl-
the three approaches.
3. An outLine of economic policy for the European Community
3.1 filedium-term poLi cies to restructure the European economy and
counter the unempLoyment probLem.
The foLLowing sections - on pubLic finance, investment, Labour
costs and enpLoynent - concern the main conponents of a strategy to reaLLo-
cate resources and finance to the ends of higher enpLoyment and
production. The objective is to increase investment, and consequentLy to
assure a transfer of finance and resources in favour of reaL activity. This
requires a significant adaptation in pub[ic finances and cost trends, par-
ticuLarLy brages. In this case, therefore, appropriate mechanisms shoutd be
devised to ensure a reat and effective transfer of resources from consump-
tion to investment.
3.1.1 Budgetary discipLine and economic converg_ence.
t'Jith pubLic expendjture nohr amounting on average in the Community
to aLmost 50 Z of gross national product, (with extremes of 60 Z reached-in
the BeneLux, Denmark and Iretand) and public borrowing amounting aLso to
half or more of cred'it expansion in the economy, governments have become
responsjbLe for a massive part of the economyrs CeveLopment. For these
reasons pubLic finance polic'ies in rnuch of the Comm.rnity must Lie at the
heart of the process of irrproved convergence - even if this concept ernbra-
ces many other aspects of economic performance.
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In a significant number of Member States it has become evident that
budgetary poLicies have escaped effective controL, as many spending
progfammes acquired powerfuL growth tendencies.
This summer the Commission addressed to the CounciL a detaiLed Com-
munication on the means by which a better controL of budget policy priori-
ties may be pursued: reduced current expenditures with a higher priority to
expenditure aiding economic deveLopment, adjustment of tax structures with
a view to favouring enpLoyment, more extensive user charges, reduced
oorrowing, the aiming at equiLibrium on current transactions, and severaL
types of inprovement'in manageriaL and politicaL controt.
There is LittLe disagreement over the direction of these poLicy
recommendations, but they need to be impLemented with a maximum of politi-
caI consensus. DeLicate issues are those of choosing the t'iming, speed and
ampLitude of policy corrections. One wouLd wish to impLement internat
adjustment programmes in an internationaI setting of rising economic acti-
vity. Some countries are cLearLy on unsustainabLe trajectories in terms of
the present scaLe of their foreign borrowing, to a degree that many of them
need now to adjust rapidty at the same time together with the economic
,.tpslting not yet assured.
The recommendation of rapid and substantiaL action must sureLy be
addressed in the first pLace to countries which are now buitding up
excessive externaL officiaL debt, and in which Large baLances of payments
deficits accompany Large public sector deficits. These economies, and espe-
ciaLLy the reLativeLy smaLL ones because of their economic openness, wiLL
derive re[ativeLy quickLy some of the majon benefits of making a cLear
break in past trends in achieving budget deficit cuts, notabLy in terms of
irprovements in the baLance of payments and in economic expectations.
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3.1.2 Investmgrt, technology and industrjaL pelforman_gg
Recent orientations from the European Councit on the promotion cf
investment (1) show that the authorities in the community favour an
enpLoyment strategy that takes the high road of advanced technoLogy" and
productivjty grourth, rather than the Low road of decreasing productivity
growth. Some of the means that witL determine the success of this strategy
are in the direct hands of government.
AnaLysis of public fjnance in recent years tend to show a ueekening
of pubLic investment in totaL public expenditure. There are reDeated exam-
pLes of pubLic expenditure cutt'ing exercises that seem to have resuLted in
heavier cuts in pubLic investment than in many current expenditLire program-
mes with stronger in-buiLt dynamics, and often Larger jnterest groups in
support. These tendencies shouLd be reversed. tlithin totaL pubLic jnvest-
ment a different baLance shouLd be achieved: for exampLe in certain
countries the effort made for 20 years jn favour of infrastructure in some
sectors (schooLs, universities, motorways) may permit some reduction in the
pubLic resources aLLocated to them. It is not obvious how these gconomjcs
baLance out against the cost of pnogrammes that warrant jncreased spendin;"
either those which contribute directLy to economic activity (research and
deveLopment, vocationaL training, nerl forms of communication, publ"ic
transport), or indirectLy (housing, urban renewaL in olci city centres
etc.). Economies in some branches of public cap'itaL spending shouLd ea:e
the financ'ing of new prioritjes that undoubtedLy exist.
The fostering of increased private investment must reLy iri f,re
first pLace on macroeconomic and generaL trading condjtions. Evicience of
this is seen in trends towards more capitaL-deepening investment an<, Less
capacity-extension jnvestment. High interest ratesr due to deveLopmer.t.i in
(1) c.f. - Communication of the Commission to the CounciL on the Problem of
Investment (JCll(82)365 finaI of 8.5.82)
- Comm,:n'icat jon of the Cemmiss jon to the European Couirci L
(COfvl(82)590 iinaL of ", 
"6.82>
Comrnuni cati<;n of the rmi ssion to the Cor"rnci L on Tn'i t'i atir.rr:r
for Promoting Investme. - (COM(82)641 tinaL of 8"10..32)"
Conctusions of the Eurcirean Counci Is of 29-30.3"8?
(point 4 to 6) and of 28-29.6.82 (page 6) 
"
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the United States and increasing budgetary expenditure, ton seLf-financing
ratjos and profitabiLjty as the counterpart to excessive costs are fun-
damentaL deterrants to investment. StabiLity in economic conditions are
aLso fundamental, as regards the rate of infLation, exchange rates and
interest rates and the internationaL trading envinonment.
Nothuithstanding the Limits to the support to investment that can
be afforded by government, inportant measures shouLd nonethetess be taken
by nationaL and Community authorities. As regards the Community in par-
ticuLar, there are responsibLities in worLd trading pol'icy and the internaL
market whose conpLetion shouLd be acceLerated. These responsibiLities
extend aLso to industriaL poLicy notabLy for certain advanced technoLogies,
and Loan financing of investment proiects in selected domains such as
energy, industrjat modernisatjon and regionaL deveLopments; the
strengthening of these poLicies shouLd be act'iveLy pursued.
In externat trade policy there is an evident danger of confLict
between increasing protectionist pressures and the objective of achieving
an advanced and coilpetitjve industriaL structure. AnaLysis of trade sta-
tistics shors that it is above aLL in the interna[ European market that the
Community has Lost ground in its market shares for technoLogicaLLy
advanced prodlcts. In seeking to maximise the openness of the norLd trading
system, aLt trading regions uitL have to share in irmort Liberatisation and
adjustment processes. The oLd industriaLised countries shouLd require that
their principa[ tradjng partners' notabLy Japan as breLL as some newLy
industriaLised countries accept irport regimes as open their own.
3.1,3 Emptovment and sociaL poLicies a1{ L@
Europers most pervasive economic prob[em is now the high LeveL of
unempLoyment. Since an increasing majority of the popuLation of working age
(increasing fast at a rate of 1 % per year) uant to work, the probLem is
fundamentaLLy one of insufficient enpLoyment creation" l.JhiLe this probLem
has worsened in most industriaLised countries in the course of the Last
year, it is on the other hand a fact that enpLoyment has not increased at
aLL in the Comrn:nity during the Last decade, whiLe it advanced by more than
20 % in l.lorth America (even 30 Z in Canada), by 15 to 20 % in certain Scan-
djnavian and other European countries, and by about 10 7. in Japan.
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rt is striking to observe that erpLoyment creation in, fon exampLe, the
United States and Japan - countries whose economic weight'is comparabLe to
that of the Community - has been on a scaLe sufficient to more than solve
Europers present unerp Loyment probLem.
AdmittedLy these performances have been in fundamentaLLy different
settings: thus the Japanese economy has combined a high growth rate of
empLoymento productivityt investment and reaL incomes; whereas in i:he
United States the good enpLoyment performance has been achieved in the
m'idst of a neLativeLy sLow growth of investment, productivity and reaL
'incomes. This points to the practicabiLity of a range of empLoyment stra-
i-eg:es" Europers ouln productivity growth performance has been between that
oi'tiie United States and Japan.
It is atso the case that the Community, in retation to the United
States and Japan, has distinct characterjstics: it is much more open to
jnternationaL trade and its socjat structure is significantty different.
NonetheLess, and even jf it is difficuLt draw from such comparisons modeLs
r:f generaL appLjcation, the performance of the Japanese and American econo-
mjes in enpLoyment creation justifies refLectjon on its underLying causes,
especiaLLy since it has been combined in these two countries with com-
parat'ive success in controLting infLation and the externaL ba[ance. It is
in particuLar apparent that the Japanese and United States exampLes have in
common a posjtive enpLoyment creation record, a more posjtive record of
enterprise profi'tabiLity, of Labour cost adaptabiL'ity to economic circum-
stances, and - for reasons Linked to sociaL structure - of Less onerous
Labour reguLations that pLace constraints on the use of production capa-
city. By corparison, enterprise profitabi Lity has faLLen to much [ouer
LeveLs over the past decade in Europe (especiaLLy in the United Kjngdom and
Bel-gium, but elsewhere too in lesser degree). The adaptabi L'ity of labour
costs to macroeconomjc conditions and those of the enterprise is Less in
Eu rope.
In the wake of the second oiL crisis, and drawing on the Lessons of
the generaL trend of reaL wages from 1974 to 1976 and more particuLarLy
of the manner in which indexation mechanisms had directLy transmitted the
effects of the first oiL shock into wage increases, the Commission advo-
cated'in 1981 certain principLes to guide income indexation practices jn
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the Community. Thus indexation shouLd excLude factors outside corporate
controL such as terms of trade Losses due to ra!, material prices, the
infLationary impact for exchange rate depreciation and changes 
.in indirect
taxes; other L'imitations shouLd be put on the speed, automaticity or
fuLLness of wage-price indexation. In the recent past, there has been a
certain convergence of practices in Line w'ith these principLes. Thus in
BeLgium and ItaLy changes in certain regimes of fuLL indexatjon have been
inptemented or announced. In other countries, for exarp[e Denmark and
France, there is increasing acceptance of the need for Labour cost adjust-
ments, and for a revision in indexation habits.
But much remains to be done to ensure in Europe a pattern of wage-
pnofit reLat'ions capable of setting unerpLoyment on a downnard trend
through the deveLopment of economic activity and the creation of new
weaLth. As in the case of budgetary poLicy corrections, there are unde-
niabLe difficuLties in determining the best trajectory. Labour cost adjust-
ment is a necessary but not sufficient conditjon of inproving empLoyment.
Moreover a h,age adjustment, especiaLLy if it is not appropriateLy phased'in
'its timing, can carry a reaL risk of defLationl macroeconomic poLicy shouLd
enabLe this risk to be averted in ways indicated beLow (p.20 seq). This may
have to depend on effectjve concertation between government and the sociaL
partners, irpLying a much stronger need for a sociaL consensus.
0ther ways of heLping the reaLLocation of resources towards
enpLoyment and jnvestment expans'ion may be found in arranging a greater
flexib'iLity of Labour costs as a function of profits, aLLied in some cir-
cumstances to greater access to equity shares, or varjous cooperative
systens" In addition there may be Links to schemes, which aim at a worker
participat'ion in corporate pLanning. ALthough the generaI approach wiIt
surely have to be decentraLised and varied, account must aLso be taken of
the tuin obiectives of sociaL justice and participation in the process of
restructuring the economy.
There are irportant and Lasting issues of sociaL poLicy which are
now ra'ised as a resutt of high unerp Loyment.
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They faLL broad[y into two categories:
the need to adapt sociaL benefits and reguLations that were set in a
macroeconomic environment of high growth and Low unempLoyment, to the
conditjons of tow growth, high unernpLoyment and iflperative budget
constraints. This raises ttro d'istinct types of probLem: that of keeping
an appropriate financiaL equiLibrium in the sociaLsecurity accounts, and
that of correcting (or au,erting) excessive LeveLs of both benefits and
Levi es which may prejudi ce suppLy potent'iaL,
- measures designed to minimise the sociaL hardship and darnage infLicted by
the high unenpLoyment leveL, or to djstribute the hardship in an
equitabLe way.
Confronted with the present difficuLties that resuLt from the sLow-
down in government revenues and at the same tjme the strongLy increas'lng
trend in sociaL transfers paid to the unempLoyed, it has become inevitabLe
that the techniques and magnitude of these transfers and benefits - notabLy
unempLoyment and redundancy benefits - be reexamined jn Member States in
reLation to priority needs. This process has moreover aLready begun in
8e[gium, Denmark, France, Germany and the NetherLands.
Such a reexamination shouLd take into account both the trend of
incomes in generaL and the fact that unenpLoyment strikes sociaL cai:egories
very unequaLLy - hitting in particuLar Less quaLified Labour which is sott;e-
times concentrated in certain sectors or regions or certajn underpriveLsged
sociaL groups. The authorities have to be guided by the need to preserve in
a period of recess'ion the fundamentaLs of sociaL justice, and to assure
that, as a priori ty, income maintenance and other sociaL programr,tes reaLL;r
reach fami Lies uith the Lowest incomes.
Since the totaL cost of sociaI transfers wi LI inevitabLy rema'in
h'igh fon several. years, the authorities shouLd aLso be cautious in com-
mitting themseLves to 'ong-term expenditure, particutarLy on pensions,
and ensure that they match the l.ikeLy trend in the rece'ipts uhich are
designed to finance tl:rm.
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As regards the distribution of unerpLoyment, there have been irpor-
tant efforts in the tast year to give priority to schemes to reduce the
particutarity high LeveL of youth unenptoyment. The CounciL has accepted
the principLe of the sociaL guarantee, rhereby aLL schooL-teavers shouLd be
assured of either continuing education, or professionaL training or work
experience. Programmes in irpLementation of this principLe are being buiLt
up, notabLy in France, Denmark and the United Kingdom, whereas Germany has
Long had weLL deveLoped policies of this kind. But the next stage in the
probLem js that of ensuring reaL erpLoyment opportunities. This wiLL
require a continuing fLow of initiatjves to make the recruitment of young
peopLe an econo{nic proposition for enpLoyers. Measures to reorganise and
reduce working time couLd make a contribut'ion to the creation of empLoyment
opportunities in so far as they heLp to reduce the present rigidities i'n
the Labour market and structures of production and do not increase Labour
costs, In order to take due account of institutionaLrsociaL or Hage-
determination differences between countries, as weLt as the speciat nature
of various act'ivities, these measures shouLd be negotiated at an
appropriate LeveL betueen the tno sides of industry. They shouLd aLso aim
at achieving a greater degree of fLexibiLity and mobiLity so as to maintain
or improve the corpet'itiveness of enterprjses. A wide range of reduced and
fLexibLe rorking hours in both the public and private sectors (part-time
uork, "job-sharing", training-teave, Iengthening and staggering of hoti-
days, short-time working) shouLd be made attractive through a better utiLi-
sation of productive capacities and the reduction of. LegaL and
instjtutionaI obstacLes. FLexibLe and voLuntary retjrement arrangements for
eLder peopte may he[p youth recruitement.
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3.2 Short-term issues of coordination and financiat potisl_!n'!x
3.2.1 EvoLution in systems of poLicy management and coordination
The probLems of managing structuraL change in economjc performance
are extremeLy difficuLt. To describe the objective is relativeLy easy. But
there are major uncertajnties surroundjng the time-Lags involved in key
economic adjustments, such as those foL[owing budgetary reforms, changes in
monetary policy or in the d'istribution of income.
These difficuLties affect aLL countries.0n the one hand corrntries
having managed to maintain a good price record or recover a much better one
- such as Germany and the UK - are at present uncertain when an improvement
in the reaL economy wiLL materiaLise. 0n the other hand, countries in
senious financiaL disequiLibrium - such as BeLgium, Denmark and IreLand -
find it difficuLt to judge the best m'ix and trajectory for their inevitable
poL'icy corrections.
A synptom of these difficuLties has been seen over the Last years
in the progress'ive abandonment of target-setting for the ind'ividuaL objec-
tives of economic poLicy: output, price stabiLisation, empLoyment. The
'instruments of poLicy controL brere seen to be insufficient for the credibLe
fixing of mu[t'ip[e objectives. lloreover the setting of unreaIisticaLLy
optimistic objectives couLd have harmfuL effects on the whoLe of the eco-
nomy.
t{eanwhiLe the irportance of rintermediater poLicy objectives, such
as budgetary, monetary and exchange rate targets, increased. l,Jith this has
come increased ah,areness of the importance of expectations of private eco-
nomic agents. The credibiLity of governmentsr commitments to their finan-
c'iaL targets has become an integrat part of the task of poticy management.
FinanciaL objectives whose credibiLity are suspect are sanctioned heaviLy
in the market, notably through interest rates.
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The retationshjp which has become mc,st uncertain js the spLit of
the nominaL growth of gross domestic product (GDP) between output and
infLation. The reLationship between the gnowth of the financjaL aggnegates
and nominat GDP has proved reLatively robust. But there is tittte consensus
cver how far an act of financiaL policy restriction or expansion wiLl'
affect reaL output versus Prices.
In the Light of recent experience it may be that the balance bet-
ween rfinaLt and rintermediatet objectives shouLd be adjusted in the direc-
tion of a cLoser monjton'ing of aggregate nom'inaL GDP trends, as has been
the case in a certain number of Member States for some time. This would
avoid the pitfaLLs of overspecific targetting of infLation and output
separateLy, where the poLicy instruments under the direct control of
governrnent were insufficient to assure success. It wouLd provide a point of
reference for the consistent setting and monitoring of monetary and budge-
tary poticies, and aid in the discussion, between and with the sociaL part-
ners, of the trend of jncomes conpatible with economic and empLoyment
objectives" FinanciaL, i.e. budgetary and monetary, poLicy wouLd have to
assure a certain trajectory for nominaL GDP and externaL equiLibrium, whiLe
income deveLopments (under free coLLect'ive bargaining or incomes
'poLiciesr) and suppLy side poLicies wouLd be responsibLe for determining
the rate of enpLoyment and productivity growth.
Existing coordination procedures shcluLd be combined with the review
of economic performance in reLation to the finaL objectives (for nominaL
GDp) set to guide financial poLicies. In the case of economies with a good
price stabiLisation performance and b,eak neaL activity the management of
financiaL poticy adjustments coutd be Less bedeviLLed by the "expectations
trap", i.e. the danger that the need to support the credibit'ity of finan-
ciaL poLicies Leads to an over-rigid commitment to rintermediater firranciaL
targets. But adjustments of policy in the Light of performance t.rouLd stiLL
have to take into account the fuIL range of constraints. The major
constraints and indication of disequitibria in the Community in 1982 are
summarised be[ow in TabLe 4.
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3.?.2 The poLicy mix in the i$mediate- situation
It has been forecast in 1981 that the business cycLe woutd soon be
r:n the upsuing; this forecast uas based on a series of deveLopments and
signs observed during the preceding twetve months. But the recovery process
stopped at an early stage. The European economy ritL thus probabty, in
'1983, be entering into its fourth consecutive year of quasi-stagnation. The
risk of a Lasting defLationary situation cannot be excLuded-
Poticy making must take account of this new environment, which
makes even more urgent the inptementation in certain Hember States of fun-
,JamentaL adjustment poticies rlith respect to pubLic finances, cost deveLop-
inents or the externaL bal.ancei these being essentiaL for the recreation of
subsequent possibi Lities for satisfactory grouth.
This sane risk"'requires on the other hand that.countries rhose
situation is sound ensure the maintainance of a Levet of activity con-
patibLe uith generaL economic stabitity and ba[ance, but sufficient to
avoid the pitfatl. of a deftationary spirat.
There fottors fron this analysis a generat orientation for the tuo
broad categories of poticies to be effected in the Comrrunity:
the rapid achievement of economic adjustments, uhich are necessary,
a[though in different degrees, in the countries uhose publ'ic deficits,
balance of payments deficits or inftation are excessive;
the majntenance of a sufficient Levet of economic activity'in countries
uhose situations are better, but which, because of the prevaiLing.
environment internationaLty or in the Comm.rnity, a?e unabte to expLoit
aLL their potentiat for grouth.
In genenaL, policy in both situations shouLd be inpLemented in ways
such that the techniques used to reduce infLation and reestabLish com-
petivitity resutt not in a reduction of aggregate performance, but in a
reaLLocation of resources in favour of productive activ'ity.
23,-
In aLL cases it must remain cLear that the basic guideLines fon
structuraL adjustment and stabiLisation stiLL hoLd good, and their imple*
mentation must be acceLerated and intensjfied. In particuLar countries in
exposed financiaL situations must rapidLy and convincingLy show that ihey
ane taking the necessary steps to bring their public and externaI borrowing
onto sustainabIe trajectories. The continued recession increases the
dangers of inaction.
For countries in stronger financiaL situations the immediate
constrajnts are obviousLy Less, but the task of achieving more output and
not mone infLation through an easing of financiaL poLicy remains extremeLy
deLicate. The first reasonabLe step in cunrent circumstances is to Let
money suppLy gronth move to the top of its target range. This has been done
by the Bundesbank, and short-term interest rates have been reduced from
1A 112 % at the beginning of 1982 to 8 Z in mid-September. This is helpful
for reaL activity, and wiLl in due course doubly hetp red'-rce the budget
deficit, directLy through officiaL debt service costs and indirectLy when
activity strengthens and tax receipts jncrease faster. It is aLso heLpful.
in the EMS exchange rate setting, in which othen participating countries
may reLax their interest rates more or Less in step with those of the
tsundesbank. The UK is aLso reducing its interest rates steadiLy.
One shouLd expect the process of interest rate reductjon to con-
tjnue in circumstances of recession and deceLerating infLation, aLthough an
indicative Ljmit could normaLLy be seen in a reaL rate of interest ctose to
the economyrs underLying rate of growth - at Least for Long-term rates,
BeLow th'is Limit there rrouLd be nisks of discouraging the formaiion of
savings requ'ired to finance a stronger investment perfortdance. If the
L'ikeLy rate of infLation and reaL act'ivity continue to be revise<i down-
wards, there would be a strongen case stjLL for the easing of financie:L
poLicies. In the outLook for 1983, it now seems quite pcss'ible that Gerrrany
and the UK wiLL be in such a situation and possibly the $ietherlands aLso.
If the economic situation worsened, countries such as 6ermany and
the United Kingdom shouLd avojd action to offset the incr€ases jir br.rdi;gt-
def icits that rouLd resuLt ", cilr the L. .ri of activity. Int€r, it :'r"i': f :duc''
tions shouLd stiLL in the p."esent phi be the main agent of countei
cycLicaL policy. But as and xhen the s pe for interest rate reductio;; i.s
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exhausted, and jf nominaL GDP is stiLL deceLerating from a Low rate, budget
poLicy initiatives to support econom'ic activity couLd in these circumstan-
ces be whoLLy corpatibLe with monetary poLicy objectives. Such budgetary
action cou[d typ'icatLy incLude tax-cuts or changes in tax and expenditure
structures des'igned to have max jrnum suppLy-side and erp Loyment benef jts.
In other countries, untiL and unLess interest rates have been
brought down jn conditions of sound pol"icy management cLose to these Lower
L'imits, thene is unLikeLy to be a case for budget poLicy reLaxation. These
interest rate conditions are themseLves reLated to the scaLe of current
pubLic borrowing, the or.rtstanding pubLic debt and other disequiLibria (see
Table 4). Thus countries with chronic budget deficits shouLd not expect to
undertake any fiscaL poLi cy relaxation: the probabi Lity of 'perverset (i.e.
negative) effects on reaL activity wouLd be hjgh. The same wouLd appear to
be true of an economy such as France, in which there is a balance of
payments disequiLibritrm, even though pubLic borrowing has been reLatjveLy
Low. In these countries whjch face severe financiaL constraints, and those
whose inf [at'ion performance has not yet soLidLy improved, their stabiLisa-
tjon efforts couLd be supponted by more cLearLy marking out a deceLerating,
normatjve trajectory for nominaL GDP. In this Hay they wouLd be signaLLing
a cei'Ling to the fLow of money transactions they were prepared to finance,
and define the framework for pay negotiations between sociaL partners.
France for exarpLe has now set an ambitious[y Low working hypothesis for
nominal GDP to underLie its 1983 budget.
The roLe of pay negotiations wiLt aLso be cruciaL in puLLing the
economy out of recession. A deceLeration in nominaL pay and infLation wouLd
itself be a major motor force of economic recovery to the extent that it
permitted further nominaL interest rate reductions, irproved profitabi Iity
and better generaL conditjons for jnvestment. In the present sjtuation of
stagfLation and weak profitabiLity and investment, economic recovery wiLL
in many countries require a period in which pay must be directed towards
both nominaL deceLeration of wages and their reaL adjustment. The point of
satisfactory disinflation may be reached sooner in some countries, for
exampLe Germany. MeanwhiLe the risks of undue transjtionaL defLation of
reaL demand, understandabLy feared in the process of disinfLation and
Labour cost adjustment, cannot be ruLed out. In this case, financiaL policy
instruments shouLd be used to offset the negatjve effects and ensure that
the trend of nominaL GDP conforms to its desired trajectory.
ui.-
+" @usijn:J-or p_olicy in the*e3lloi elsg{
The Er.rropean business recovery has not materiaLised in the course
o-'1?S? so far, and recent indicators show signs of a reLapse of business
i;r:iif idei-ice, particuari Ly in Germany and the United Kingdom. About hal"f of
the Comr*unity economy remains affLicted by serious disequiLibrium probLems
a:; regards infLation, the baLance of payments and pubLic finance; aLmost
a "L Member States are experiencing graveLy high LeveLs r:'f unemp Loyment.
The prospects for next year are governed by confLicting infLuences.
There has been an easing of world variables such as the price of oiL and
rilte of interestu but it must be avoided that these trends are reversed in
the earl-y stages of an upswing. The prospects are however far from being
reassuring, and the risk of a defLaticlnary spiraL must not be excLuded, ALL
musi be done to dissipate rapidly the present pessimism.
These probLems must be countered by attacking the structuraL
wr-.aknesses of the European economy, and are refLected especiaLLy'in a Low
pt^opensity of the private sector to invest and increase empLoyment. These
wr:aknesses are aLso manifest in much of the Community in an inbaLanced
distribution of resources between the government and productive sectors, of
irrcome betrreen hrages and profits, and of expenditure between consumption
and investment.
ReversaL of these imbaLances uould seem to Lre inescapabLe com-
p'lnents of a strategy to return to an econorm/ with higher empLoyment,
'investment and productivity; indeed these ends have to be the counterpart
arrd justification of severe income and pubLic finance adjustments. PoL'icy
and concertation between the sociaL partners have to be concerned with
assuring that the corpLete process materjaLises.
Management of the process of siruLtaneous cycIicaL and structuraL
r,rcovery is extremeLy diffjcuLt. Nothing can reLieve each country from its
orrn efforts, but taking jnto account the interdependence of economies and
tile present internationaL situation, a second objective must be pursued
with determjnation: imprrovement of economic poLicy coordination among the
r'ndustriaL'i sed countries in order to increase the chances of success.
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InternationaLLy the Community shouLd continue in its efforts of
persuasion that poticy in the main internatjonaL reserve currency centres
shouLd be actirreLy concerned to avoid excess'ive f Luctuations of interest
and exchange rates. To this end it is necessary to mainta'in efforts to
organise a reaL internationaL monetary cooperation between the principeL
monetary authoritjes. The stabiLity of the worLd financiaL system requires
that the'internationaL currencies be managed with this evidentLy in mind,
and that agree,nents are noul pnomptLy reached between the industrjaLised
countries on strengthening the financiat capacity of the Ii4F and the tCorLd
Bank.
For the present, interest nates are being reduced, and care shouLd
be taken to consoljdate thjs trend in the United States and Europe. filone-
tary policy in Europe has in generaL avoided extremeLy sharp movements in
financiaL conditions. llith evidence of further deceLeration in infLation
and weak economic activity especialty in Germany" the United K'ingdom and
the NetherLands, these countries can afford to Lead continuing interest
rate reductions in Europe.0ther countnies in the Community face substan-
t.iaL baLance of payments constraints and most have commitments t*ithin the
EilS, In these countries there nay be scope for paraLLeL interest nate
reduct'ions. However in some of the most infLationary countries where the
reaL rate of interest'is very Lotl or negative, the objective musl be to
reduce infLation faster than nominaI interest rates.
As regards budgetary poLicy, countries experiencing both continuing
necession and a satisfactory reduction in infLation and t+hich face sLight
disequiLibria or constra'ints, shoutd avoid a bLocking of iautomatic
stabi Lisers'. In severaL other countries targe pubLic sectcr def icits ,'ul.e
out any possibiLity of their admitting cycLjcaL budgetary action for the
f oreseeabLe f uture, and, on the cont rary, irqcose a rapid redr.tction of
budget and externaL deficits. Tax-cutting stimuLation of the economy shoul-d
onLy be envisaged once the process of interest rate reduction has rea;heci
its L.imits, and in countries uhose pubtic finances are in a sound con'-
dition.
z(.- o1s
In the functioning of the European I'lonetary System a positive
feature in the Last year has been the undertaking of more thorough budget
and income adjustment measures to accompany exchange rate reaL'ignments-
These tendencies shouLd be further strengthened in the period ahead, so as
graduaLty to restore a better convergence in fundamentaL economic perfor-
mance.
Hoh,ever, even a successful management of a cycticat recovery in the
year ahead wiLL not solve the probLem of unerpLoyment. This requires deep
changes to diminish in many countrjes excessive pubLic expend'iture, to
increase profjtabLe investment, and increase massiveLy the propensity to
emptoy.0n this Latter point the ro[e of a greater noderation and fLexibi-
Lity in reaL Labour costs shouLd be stressed. To the extent that this
policy may risk contributing to a transitionaL defLation of demand, the
weakness shouLd be conpensated through monetary and where possibte budge-
tary measures to support demand, for exanpLe, according to cjrcumstances,
through a reduction in interest rates or taxation.
The aim of the foregoing strategy is basicaLty to reestablish a
better empLoyment sjtuation. It is evident that its success depends on
ach'ieving a consensus on the overaLL poLicy priorities' It is vitaL that
the strategy covers, notabty, the need not to retax in the struggLe against
infLation and to take into account the deveLopment of jmport price
increases in dec jding wage adjustments. lrloreover it i s c Lear that every
effort shouLd be made to encourage enpLoyment creation, 'in economicaLLy
sound conditions and notabLy in a systematic favouring of investment,
through removjng obstacLes to the setting up of new enterprises and through
reinforcing fLexibiLjty in the organisation of working time. It is equaLLy
necessary to have constantLy in view the fact that the inrpact of
unenpLoyment differs among sociaL groups: in this respect efforts shouLd be
made (for exanpLe in the fieLd of incomes or of the reorganjsation of
ulork'ing time) to ensure that the consequences of the present situation do
not have an excessive inpact on certain sociaL groups.
The present Low LeveL of European exchange rates against the
doL[ar, uhich seems to be persisting despite changing interest rate dif-
ferent.iaLs, may be taken as a favourabLe starting point for a Lasting
adjustment of income, investrnent and erpLoyment fundamentaLs in Europe' The
recent changes in wortd interest rates shoutd aLso now fac'ititate a reva-
Luation of the Yen. The acconpanying internaL adjustment of incomes and
pubL'i c finances are as inportant in Europers economic reLation vis-l-vis
the rest of the worLd, as they are for indjviduat countries whose exchange
rates are reaLigned uithin the EMS.
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PAIIT II. The economi es of Member States
In BeLgium, the stance of economic poLicy foLLow'ing the reaLignment
of the franc has made it possib[e to start correcting the baLance of payments
and the government deficito and improving the competitive posit'ion of BeLgian
firms. These measures have necessariLy tempered growth and empLoyment in
1987., and the recovery of these variables in 1983 wjLl stjLL depend to a
Large extent on the internationaL situation, in view of the inevitable domestic
constraints. The rise in consumer prices, temporari ly fuelLed by the depre*
ciation of the effective exchange rate, shouLd sLow down considerabLy, and the
baLance of payments deficjt on current account may be expected to contract
once more"
The rehabi L i tat'ion po L'i cy i nt roduced in 1982, i n conf ormi ty notab Ly
t'lil. l"r thn' recommendations of the Counc'i L and the Comm'i ssion, wi LL need to be
foLLowed by an effort in 1983, probabLy susta'ined unti L the mid-1980s, to
estabLish more favourabLe and stabLe conditions for growth.
Progress has been achieved towards greater competjtivity, and the
consumpt'ion demand of househoLds has been kept within the Limits requ'ired
for an improvement in the baLance of payments on current account; but to
consoLidate these achievements, the expansion of incomes must remain moderate
for some time to come; the measures regard'ing the jndexation of wages and
other incomes applied in 1982 could be prolonged in an approprioate format
in'1983, to contribute to this aim. Defining the gu'ide[ines for the draft
1983 budget earLy in August, the government announced its intention of
consuLting both sides of industry about the practicaL arrangements for a
formula to keep the rise in wage costs to no more than 7 % in 1983.
As to budgetary pol.icy, the government announced its intention of
keeping the rate of expans'ion of expenditure to 7.5 % in 1983 : this means
a reaL dectine in aggregate, and a sLight nominaL increase in expenditure
other than that relat'ing to unemployment and the pubLic debt. It further
jntends to reduce the central government borrowing requirement to 10.5 %
of gross donrest i c product 
"
These adjustments are the very Least that
for 1983 and with a v'iew to restoring the economy
terni; any departure from these objectives during
rapi ciLy correcteci"
The successof the government's measures is
recovery of private.'investment, which is essentiaL
economic act'ivity, and to a Lasting improvement in
tax measures shouLd aLso contribute to this. The
stance/ invoLving stricter conditions for aid and
'itseLf corrtribute to a greater rationaLisation of
stimutate the founding of new fiims'
?9 --
wiLL be required both
to health in the medium
the year wi l-L have to be
necessari Ly for the
to the restructuring of
empLoyment; the 1982
new industriaL poLicy
greater seLectiv'ity, shouLd
firms in d'ifficuLties and
The margin of manoeuvre for monetary poLicy h,i lL remain
narrow/ for the current baLance of payments deficit and the Tneasuryts
sizable f inancing rreeds t"i'iLL Limit the scope for an autonomous reduction
in interest rates-
In the medium term, the moderation of costs and inCustriaL restruc-
turing are stiLL essentiaL condjtions for a Lasting improvement in empLoyment"
SimiLarLy, it is importantras pLanned by the authorit'ies, to haLve the generaL
government borrowing requirement as a percentage of gross domest'ic prociuct by
1985, so as to break the vicious circLe of deficit and interest payments that
weighs so heavy on public budgets and the current baLance of payments, and
thus hampers economi c expans'i on.
l,n
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in !S!mark, econom'ic act'ivity in i982 uras more dynamic than jn
the other Commun'i ty countri es, with a gror,,th rate for gross domest'i c
product of about 2 %. As in 1981, growth t.tas stimulated by improved
competit'iveness due jn particuLar to the depreciation of the effective
exchange rate of the krone. The empLoyment trend t,tas supported by
measures taken jn June by the Government to sustain investment, deveLop
vocationaL training and create new jobs.
After improving considerabLy in 1981, the baLance of payments on
current account deteriorated once again 1n 1982, as the substantiaL
increase in the cost of servic'ing the externaL debt more than offset the
contjnuing improvement in the baLance on goods and services" At the same
time, the pubLic finance situation has grown stead'iLy worse. The net
centraL government borrowing requirement for 1982 1s put at DKR 57 000
miLfion, or about 12 % of GDP, much Larger than the deficit pnovided for"jn the draft budget and'in the guidelines adopted by the CounciL in December
1981, in spite of the increase in taxation in mid-1982. The main reasons
for this are the specific neasures in favour of employment,
but espec'iaLLy the ever-growing cost of servic'ing the pubLic debt and the
rapidty expand'ing trend of certain components of sociat security expenditure.
The present tnend departs in several important ways from the strategjc path
mapped out at the beginn'ing of 1980, which aimed, among other things, at a
steady 'improvement in the baLance-of-payments deficit.
One of the important objectives for econonic poL'icy in 1983 uiLl
thus be resoLuteLy to undertake the re-estabLishment of macro-economic
equi tibrium.
To this end, a very strict budgetary poLicy wi,.l be required in
1983. EarLy'i n October the new Government annc,unced a programme designetl,
amonE other th'i ngs, tc'hoLd back the expans'i on of sociaL transfer payrnents
t
. 
to Limit pubLic sector pay, to
raise certain public service charges and to introcluce taxes on pension
funds and insurance companies. These measlres should Lead to a reduciion
of about DKR 11 000 mil,Lion in the def icit provided for in the in!i jeL
budget for 1983 urhich u,ruLd have reachecj aLrrrost 15.5 y" o"f gross nationaL
product.
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The net centraL Eovernment borrowing requ'irement shouLd thus be
L'im'ited to some 13 7" of gross domest'ic product in 1983. Th"is should be
the first stage in a steady decLine in the budget deficit after the very
rapid expansion over recent years and wiLL requ'ire a sustained effort
in the com'ing years. It is aLso important that the centraL governmbnt
initiative shouLd be supported by simiLar action at LocaL authority
teveL. Strict management of pubL'ic fjnance shouLd contribute to a
dec Line in interest rates and to creating f inanciaL conditions conducive
to a durabLe recovery of invesLment.
To ensure a more moderate trend of prices and incomes, a lllage
freeze has been introduced, 'in force untiI March 1983. BiLLs nold approved by
ParLiament provide that th'is freeze shouLd be foLLowed by the suspension of
cost of L'i ving adjustment and a freeze on certain non-!,age'i ncomes over
the next tuo years. If the resuLts of negotiations between the two sides
of industry next spring Lead to suffic'ientLy moderate wage deveLopments,
there wi LL be some reduction in taxes on personaL income. ALL in aLL,
these measures wi L L contrjbute to strengthen'ing Dan'i sh competitiveness,
on which the deveLopment of exports and economic activ"ity in generaL depend.
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In the Fedg:aL RepubLic of Germany activity decLined jn 1982
particularLy in the second haLf of the year. UnempLoyment rose sharpLy'
both because of a faLL in the numbers empLoyed and because of demographi;
developments which are now bringing a LarEe number of younE people onto
the Labour market. However, infLat'ionary trends eased, and the externaL
posit'ion'improved markedly, with the current account expected to be in
equiLibrium for the year as a whole
The pnesent out Look i s at best for a very modest rate of gro!,,t h i n
1983 (about 1 %) which should gather stnength as the year proceeds as a
resuLt of a sLight recovery of exports and fixed 'investment!1)fft"."
aggreEates wiLL benefit fnom the favourabLe impact of faLLing infLation and
interest nates, together with the various measures introduced by the
Government in 1982 to stimuLate cap'itaL spending-
The monetary authorities room fon manoeuvne increased substantiaLLy
in 1982, partLy because of an improv'ing baLance of payments and faLLing
infLation and partLy because of the decLine in interest rates on doLLar
denominated assets. AccordingLy, German interest rates eased and the
Centra[ Bank Money stock tn,as allowed to groul at a nate close to the upper
Limit of the target range. However, as a resuLt of the Lack of cconomic
growth, the deveLopments of pubLic expenditure and borrowing were Less
favourabLe than the authorities had hoped, and the Government was obliged to
introduce suppLementary budgets in the course of the yearr to permit a
higher LeveL of borrowing by the Federation.
0n the basis of pnesent poLicies the underLying trends of cutput
and empLoyment are unsatisfactory in the period ahead; Low rates of
expansion couLd weL L persi st into the med'ium term'
The FederaL RepubLicrs expected economic growth rates for 1982
and 1983 wi LL be - in contrast to the sixties and seventies - [ot'rer than the
Community average and supported to a lesser extent than in the past by
export demand. A more buoyant economic recovery must therefore depend upon
(1) lccording to the L;,test assessments
with 198?, cannot be ruled out'
./.
a zero rate of growth'in 1983, compared
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a significant stnengthening of internal demand, especiaLLy in an
environment of more rigorous economic poticjes in Germanyrs trading partners'
Moreover, no1a1 that most of the adverse effects of the second oiL price
shock on infLation and the baLance of payments have been overcome in
Genmany much quicker than elsewhere, the mix of poL'icy shouLd contribute to-
wards an.improvement in investment and avoid deftat'ionary effects which couLd
arise from an exessiveLy rapid'reiiuction of the budget deficit or adjustments
to the levet of reaI wages.
Given the'importance of both demand and profit expectations and
financiat conditions fon encQuraging investment, fiscaL poLicy shouLd
principaLLy concentrate, in the immediate future, on restructuring pubLic
expenditures in favour of capitaL formation, research and deveLopment and
professionaL tra'in'r3, rather than on a reduction in the defjcit in a year
of Low on zero growth and, ensure a progressive reduction in the Longer
term. Therefore,the net borrowing of generaL government could (shouLd)
be heLc stabLe in 1983 at some 4 % expressed as a percentage of gross
dome st i c pr oduc t .
In view of the favourabLe outLook for infLation, monetary pol'icy
shouLd be conducted in a manner such that economic expansion is
faciLitated notab[y by Letting CentraL Bank Money increase at a
suffic'ientLy high rate. The room for manoeuvre generated by the
improvements on the externaL side and the decLine in the rate of inflation
shouLd be used to encourage, as a matter of priority, further faLLs in
interest rates.
Even w.ith a rate of growth ctose to one wh'ich is presentLy
forecast for 1983, it wouLd not be possibLe, 'in the near future, to
avoid a further deterioration on the Labour market. 0n the whoLe,
Germanyrs competitive posit'ion, its productiv'ity record and the profitabiLity
of its firms, do not suggest that a major reduction in reaL wages in general
is a necessary prerequisite for stronger growth. Greater attention shouLd
nevertheless be given to the appropriate structure of wage d'ifferentiaLs,
ensuring that they contribute to the mobiL'ity of [aboun, so fostering
the necessary readjustments jn the economy.
7/. 
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Greece is stiLL confronted with the probLem of the resumotion of economic
growth jn an externaL context which has become, and is L'ikeLy to remain, evenmore
difficuLt than before. The short-term outLook for 1983 is a LittLe better in
that respect, and shouLd, if the forecasts prove accurate, heLp the recovery
to get under way. But the probLem of adjusting the economy to its environment
i s mainLy a structuraL matter : no durabLe improvement in pr"oduct'ion
is possibte without a tono drawn-out sys-
tematic effort to increase the scope for domest'ic suppLy, wh'ich invoLves restor-
ing high'investment ratios. Such an effort must be combined w'ith vigourous
measures to combat infLation, wh'ich plesentty distorts the aLlocation of production
factors and so inevitabLy hampers desinabLe structuraL change.
Present poLicy has attempted to Lay foundations for action on these
two fronts, to be specified comprehensiveLy'in the five-year pLan at present
in preparation. By combin'ing a Large increase in the Lowest incomes early in
1982 wlth pr"ice controLs on necessities and a major seLective increase'in
taxation, th'is poLicy has aimed to stimuLate a cautious recovery in consumer
demand whiLe slowing down the rise in prices. An indication system of adapting
incomes and pensions has been'introduced, and its effects shouLd Lead to
spontaneous moderation of the nominaL trend of incomes, as Long as there is no
immediate pressure to restore the differentjaLs that have been eroded. Another
aim of the poli cy 'is to reduce aggregate domesti c cred'it as a proportion of
gross domestic product, by vigo!ousLy restraining the expanding trend of the
pubLic sector deficit. LastLy, the poLicy aims at encouraging the recovery of
investment through a seLective credit poLicy that has succeeded in keeping reaL
interest rates at a very Low Leve[, and by completing the system of a very
varied range of sectoraL and regionaL aids.
These efforts are presentLy being made. However exports have
stagnated so far and
investment has given no signs of picking up. In the circumstances, the
growth rate might approach 1 % in 1982. Moreover, it has proved
impossibLe to compress Liquidity because the pubLic sector deficti couLd hitherto not
be restrained as far as uas hoped. As to the drachma, it has depreciated further,
as the authorities were seek'ing to offset the effect of infLation differentiaLs
..:
on Greecers competitiveness.
In soite of these neLatively poor resuLts, present tight poLicy shouLd
not be reLaxed; for it is essentiaL to controL infLation if the financiaL
conci.itions are to be estabLished to aLLow the major investment drive required
to transform economic structures.
Economic pol,icy wiLL thus have to make use of aLl the means avaiLable
to ensure that nominaL trends beg'in to sLow down in 1983. In part'icuLar'
efforts to restrajn the rise in incomes wilL have to be continued, in appLying the
index*linking mechanism the disadvantages of excess'iveLy narrowing the overalL
range of wages and salaries shou[d be avoided'
price controLs must aLso cont'inue so as to prevent excessive increases'
The Liqu1dity ratio in the economy wiLL have to be considerably reduced
by bringing the net public sector borrowing requ'irement down to beLow
fi % of Eross domestic product via cuts in current expenditure and increases
in pubLic service charges/ by tighten'ing credit controts and by encouraging
stabLe savings. To achieve the LaSt aim, interest rates can no Longer be
kept at an artificiaLLy Low reaL Level- : more account wiLL have to be taken
of market conditions when they are fixed.
7A-
In Francerthe recovery engendered by the upturn in demand in 1981 has re-
suLted'in asharp deterioratjon of the trade baLance"The externaL position as
weLL as the financiaL equilibrium and competitive position of compan.ies
have been disturbed. The expansion of domestic credit resuLting from a growing
pubLic deficit and financ'iaL probLems among fi rms, has fueLLed infLa-
tion when jt was decLining eLsewhere. The exchange rate for the French
franc was adaoted in 0ctober 1981 and in June 1982.
The reaLignment within the European Monetary System'in June 1982 was
accompan.i ed by a ri gorous recovery programme" It tlas immediateLy foILowed
by temporary un'iLateraL measures to bLock, defer or Limit rises in prices and
incomes, in an attempt to break the vicious circLe of infLation, and by the
announcement of a vigorous effort to controL the expanding trend of the
pubLic defic'it. At the same time, the money suppLy grollth targets
for 1982 and 1983 have been revised downwards to take account of the expected
contraction in nominaL trends. Th'is change of course shouLd heLp to bring
inffat'ion down faster, to wetL under 10 % in 1983, and at the same time
Leatj to some 'i mprovement in the current baLance of payments. But this w'i LL
entait a considerabLy tower rate of growth of domest'ic demand, no higher
than 1 /, a yealin 1982 and again in 1983. Specif ic budgetary and financiaL
measures wiLL, moreover, a'im at sh'ifting the batance of demand from consump-
tion to investment.
This programme can succeed onLy with the active support of both s'ides
of jndustry, for the main condition of success for the present adjustment
poLicy is al-so the princ'ipaL factor cf uncerta iniy : a reduction in the rate
o'r' expans ion of costs" It i s -i mportant that the compuLsot"y ineasuies in
force unti L 31 October 198? be foltoured by a p'rices and
incornes poLicy which, urhrLe gradualLy restoritrg as nruch freedorn of decision
as possibIe, can neutraLjze the determin'ing factor in the infLat'ionary
si:i raL : the de fact:c'r 'i nciex-linking of remunet'a'.icns ^ anC ncre general-l-y
incomes - to past price rises.
The poLicy adopted for financing the economy/ moreover/ wiLl have to strike
the appropriate baLance between the restrictive stance nequired by the objective
of reducing infLationary pressures and ensuring exchange rate stabiLity, and the
need for financinq business on condit'ions that wiLL not hinder their investment
effort. The controL of the expansion of domestic credit is therefore essen-
tiaL. This assumes that:
- the grot.lth of the EeneraL govennment borrrtwinE requirement is haLted, at Least
'in reLative terms, and that the target announced for the borrow'ing rgqujrement' sta-
biLization in 1983 at the 1982 leveL of 3 % of gross domestic product, wiLL be
achieved, and, consequent Ly,
- that the SociaL Secunity system, which is moving towards targe deficits, wiLL
be baLanced, as the Government has announced, both by mak'ing economies and by in-
cneasing contribut'ions,
In this way, it wiLL be possible to create the margin of manoeuvre needed to
finance priority research projects, reinforr:e industriai. structure and promote
empLoyment, and ensure that, as inflation decLines, reaL interest rates wiLL be
Low enough to minim'i ze the financiaL burden on bus'i ness" The compLete success
of the new incentives to Long-term savings, particuLarLy'in venture capital, are
an important eLement in this strategy.
The eventual restoration of sustained qrowth wiLL rrot depend onLy on the
success of disinfLation poLicy and on improvement in the international environ-
ment. It wiLL aLso requ'ire a structuraL poLicy to ensure that the economy
adapts efficientLy to that environment. Among othen things, industriaL action
by the authorities t.riLL have to guide the economy towards more competitive
structures by moderniz'ing the weaker sectors and encouraging the deveLopment
of advanced technoLogy industries, most of which are notl in the pubLic sector.
It'i s aLso necessary that possibLe measures for work sharing are ent'i reLy
compatibLe with the needs of enhancing productivity, and that they avoid any
di rect or indi rect increase on fi rms t costs.
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The growth of economic activity in !1gl4! in 1982 has been
compared with rates achieved in the recent past. The rate of price
was far out of Line with the Community average although it seems to
moderate recentLy. Both the balance of payments and the pubLic
sector accounts continr-red in serious def icit however, wh'iLe f oreign
borrowing, a reLated probLem, has surged ahead to new h'igh Levels.
trends appear particuLarty worry'ing when v'iewed in the Light of the
rising unempLoyment rate which may exceed 12 % in 1982.
modest
infLation
These
rapidly
The outLook for 1983 1s uncertain. Without nevv corrective measures,
and notwithstanding a growth rate in GDP of about 2%, the Exchequer Borro*
wing Requirement could welL approach this yearrs Level of about 15 % of GDP
whiLe the rate of infLation, aLthough faLLing t"louLd stiLl be running at the
rate of 13 y.. Under these conditions, the current poLicy stance must not only
be maintained but must be vigorousLy pursued.
The problems in the Irish economy originate to a Large degree in
the faiLure to adjust after the two oiL shocks. The openness of the lrish
economy and its heavy dependence on externaL energy resources made adjustment
imperative. Impressive rates of export growth, often achieved in difficuIt
trading circumstances, couLd not offset the steady forward march of imports,
which reflected the faiLure of domestic consumption to take account of the
deterioration in the terms of trade. The real vaLue of
earnings was maintained in the face of rising import
costs and tax increases, thus contributing to a very rapid rate of price in-
flation well above the levets experienced in Irelandrs other ElvlS partners.
This reduced the economy's abiLity to compete. 0nLy by reversing these trends
can competitiveness be strengthened, the rate of growth in output be increased
and progress in reduc'ing the teveI of unemp[oyment be made.
1n the Last few years, public expenditure policies have tendeC to
accomodate these deveLopments by aLLowing a rapid advance'in pubLic sector
pay LeveLs, maintain'ing and improv'ing the reaL vaLue of sociaL transfers and
continuing the ambitious scale of the Public Cap'itaL Programme. ALthough
pubLic borrowing for capitaL investment purposes had been accepted practice
?o-
'in Ir.eLand,the growth of current expenditure resu[ted in Large deficits on the
currr.nt bud3et a.:i r{elL.There is a wi'de consensus that the current def icit must
be eLiminated since it adds to pubtic debt, much of it fore'ign denominated,
without generating a stream of income with which to meet the heavy servicing
charges. To do this wiLl require substantiaL reat cuts in current expendi-
ture programmes since Large annuaL tax increases such as those imposed in
recent years/ are unLikeLy to be prudent economicaLLy.
Moreover, the obIigatory nature of aLI debt charges reduces the
Governmentrs room for manoeuvre. Thus, whiLe recognising the need for fur-
ther pubLic capitaL investment in IreLand, the situation demands that each
projectrs potentiaL benefjts to the economy must be severety scrutinised
with a view to obtain'ing a better return from scarce nesources.
Io revense the d'ivergent performance of the Irish economy stern
action to reduce the pubLic sector deficit is necessary. The consequenr
reduction in deficit financ'ing through monetany means wouLd assist in reducing
infIation,bearing in mind that funther tighten'ing of the current CentraL
Bank credit guide['ines may not be appropriate in present circumstances. The
package of expenditure cuts announced'in earLy August is a weLcome first
step in the direction of bringing the pubLic sector" deficit under controL.
These efforts however, wiLL need to be carried through and amplified in
1983 if the public accounts are to be restored to a sound basis. In thisresFec!
a Current Budget Deficit of 5% of gross'domestic product and an Exche,quer Borro-
wing Requirement of 127" of grosS domestic product wouLd be appropriate targets for
1983. At the same time, it is essentiaL that, in particuLar, workers in
the sheLtered sectors of the economy take a more reaListic view of the
economic possibi lities and moderate wage increase demands.
These measures wilL not automatica[Ly remove aLL the economyrs diffi-
cuLties, but, after a period, by stnengthening competit'iveness and restoring
the Exchequerrs scope for growth promoting poL'icies, they wilL enabte the
problems of job creation and deficiencies on the suppLy side to be tackted
effectiveLy and the good progress made in'industriaLisation to be consoLi-
dated and buiLt upon. In this connection, the setting up by the authorities
of a medium term framework to tackLe the probLems of high unemptoyment and
Large externaL deficits whi[e restoring baLance to the pubIic finances and
bringing inflation under controL is an indispensabLe eLement-
ItaLy has made progress towards adjusting'its economy to externaL constraints.
It has managed to do this by accepting a contraction in domestic demand - achieved
in 1981 - and with the heLp of dynamic exports. These good results have been due,
among other th'ings, to a more stringent nonetary pol'icy. NevertheLess the rate of
jnfLation (1715%in 1982) is stiLL far out of'Line with the Commun'ity average (10%
the same year) and other Large industriatised countries. The batance of payments
has remained in defi cit desoite the necession.
Progress to date is not, however, sufficient to justify anything more than a
Lim'ited expansion'in domestic demand, and in particuLar consumption, in the short
term. The restoration of a growth trend commensurate t"lith medjum-term potentiaL
depends not only on an improvement in the internationaL environment, but aLso r:n
the progress made in reducing the government deficit, the controL of costs and the
adaptation of productive structures. Monetary poLicy can onLy be reLaxed to the
extent that progress is made in reducing the rate of jnflation and the externaL
disequiLibrium. In the circumstances, growth wiLL not reach 17" in 1982, and wjLL
hardLy exceed that figure in 1983.0n the other hand, the batance of payments
deficit on current account wi[[ continue to contract and disinfl-ation wiLL make
sLow but steady progress.
An important set of financiaL decisions was taken at the end of JuLy 1982.
A rapid acceptance by ParLiament of aLL the measures proposed by the government
wouLd be an important step towards a return to baLanced growth. The main measures
invoLved a Large increase in pubLic revenue. They incLuded increases'in pubLic
service charges, increased rates for VAT and most excise duties, a higher rate
of corporate taxation, a tax amnesty w'ith immediate payments in discharge of
f.jabi Lity, and increases jn certain sociaL security contributions. The extra
burden of compuLsory Levies might be somewhat attenuated by new measures for
personaL income tax reductions subject to wage agreements that compLy with
Government guideLines. The Finance Act should aIso extend the insured personrs
contribution to the cost of heaLth service. It 'is f oreseen that the
overaLL effect of these measures, combined w'ith others stiLl to be specified,
shou[d be to reduce the Treasuryrs net borrowing requirement from about 15 % of
gross domestic product in 1982 to about 1?% in 1983. Such an effort is indis-
pensabLe to ensure that totaL domestic credit does not expand beyond reasonabLe
Iimits, and that the Iiquidity ratio decIines without'imposing excessiveLy high
jnterest rates on the private sector.
It is nolv up to the two sides of industry, during the present round of
negotiations for the renewaL of working conditions to commit themseLves to
r,,oLuntary restraints on the nominaL trend of incomes. 0nLy if this top
pr"iority a'im can be achieved can the d'if f erentiaL between inf tation in
ItaLy and that in its main trade partners be reduced; llithout such a reduc-
tion the economy would suffer for a Long time from the adverse effects of a
Loss in competitiveness. At aLL events, in order to extract the economy from the
infLationary spiraL, jt is'important to gain definitive acceptance for the
idea that an actuaL practice wages shoutd be Linked to expected future
devetopments rather than foLLowing past price movements. As a first step
towards graduaL disinfLation, a target rate for the rise in prices and
unit Labour costs of about 13 % shouLd be set for 1983, some 4 po'ints Lower
than in 198?.
A strategy of graduaL disinflation is the major condition for a more
satisfactory deveLopment of the economy in the medium term. A persistently
high infLation rate creates financ'iaI pressures and Leads to uncertainty
about profitabiLity, thus distort'ing the aILocation of the factors of produc-
ticln. It couLd, in particuLar, depress investment and research, on which
depend the deveLopment of advanced technoLogy sectors and the generat
disseminat'ion of technologicaL progress throughout the economy. Production
structures wiLL in fact have to be adapted in this t"Jay to compensate for the
decLine which threatens certain basic jndustries and in some consumer goods
'industries whose competitiviness wouLd be rapidLy eroded'if present output
condi t i ons t,lere to Last .
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Econom'ic activity in Luxembourg 'improved onLy very stight ty in
1982. The devaLuation of the Luxembourg franc in February 1982 did not
significantLy stimuLate exports because of the particuLar stnucture of
Luxembourgrs externaL trade. Prices, whjch were aLready rising fairLy
rapidly early in the year, have since gained momentum; at the same time,
a sLower rise in wages foLLow'ing the measures concerning the indexation
arrangements Led to a decLine in private consumption. The pubLic finance
defi cit remained moderate.
Economic activity couLd recover sLightLy'in 1983 under the
infLuence of expand'ing exports, but the effects on empLoyment wiLL be
modest, The rate of consumer price increase wiLL decLine substant'iaLLy
now that the effects of the devaLuation are graduaLLy being d'issipated,
and owing to the slowdown in the rise of costs in 1982.
In princ'ipLe, the indexation mechanism is to be restored in January
1983. It wouLd nevertheLess be desirabLe, to maintain competjtiveness and
consoLidate disinfLation, if the government and the ttnlo sides of industry
couLd come to an agreement on neutraLiz'ing - at Least partiaLLy or tempo-
rari Ly - the retationship between b,ages and other incomes on the one hand,
and the price trend on the other. This would help to hold down costs, and
thus make an essentiaI contribution to the economic restructuning on which
the eventuaL 'improvement of the empLoyment situation depends. The measures
taken in 1982 to increase geographicaL and sectoraL mobiLity'in the Labour
force should be reinforced so as to reduce the cost to the budget of the
action to aLLeviate unempLoyment.
FiscaL poLicy,6t a whole should remain cautious to prevent any
accentuation of the expanding tendency of the deficit that has emerged over
the past few years, and to provide some margin for manoeuvre for spec'ific
measures in favour of employment shouLd they prove necessary. This
requi rement couL<-l be met by keeping the centraI government borrowing requi re-
ment for 1983 to no more than 1,2 % oI gross dornestic procluct.
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In the NetherLands, after seveFaL years of sLugg'ish act'ivrty,
the outLook'is Limited for growth in 1983, rdith LittLe LikeLihood of an
'improvement 'in the empLoyment situation. Whi Lst this forecast is
simi Lar to that f ar a number of other fvlember States, the situation in
the NetherLands appears much more favourable from the point of v'iew of
economic baLance. Disinf Lation wi LL corrt'inue, with the rate erf increase
of consumer prices falL'ing to 3,5 Z by the end of 1983i
baLance of payments surpLus, aLready very Large in 1982, couLd once again
be substantiaL, perhaps 5 Y" of gross domest'ic product.
The outLook beyond 1983 does, houreven, g'ive some cause for concern
empLoyment opportun'ities wiLL be insufficient to absorb the strong growth
of the Labour force, and in foreign tracie the favourabLe effects on the
baLance of payements of the export of naturaL gas w'iLL graduaLLy run out
of momentum.
Al.though the economy wilL be Less unbaLanced than that of the
other lvlember States, government finance wi LL sti LL require strict controL;
for untess further measures are taken, the disparity wiLL widen between
revenue, affected by the Low growth predicted for 1983, and expend'iture,
rising fast in aggregate as a resuLt of the sociaL legisLation adopted
during the period of fuLL econom'ic expansion. Desp'ite the major efforts
that have aLready been made to reduce the deficit, the borrowing requirement
of centraL government and tocaL authorit'ies could welL amount to more than
1O % of nationaL 'income in 1982. The governement that comes to office
after the eLections of 8 September 1982 r.riLL therefore have to take further
measures to Limit it, whiLe avoiding a new increase in the tax burden,
atready one of the heaviest in the Community. Savings on expenditure should
be geared essentiaLLy to bring'ing down the rap'id growth of sociaL transfer
payments, notabLy by reducing the number of beneficiaries for certain
schemes, and to Limiting the increase in civiL service pay. 0n baLance,
it would be des'irabLe that net generaL government borrowing should not
exceed apprec'iab[y, ln 1983, the 1982 leveL (8r4 7. of gross domestic
product ) .
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StabiLising the deficit and reduc'ing 'it in the medium tenm
shouLd aLso facilitate the recovery of investment.
It is an essentiaL condition to enabLe the monetary authorities to cont.inue
to reduce interest rates, after the substantiat faLL that occurred in 1982.
This in turn is a key element'in a med'ium-term strategy, whose aim must be
to offset, by radicaL restructuring, based on a major investment drjve, and
by the deveLopment of advanced technoLogicaL 'industries, the adverse effects
of the de-industriaLization process that has been going on for over ten years
nohl.
This strategy aLso invoLves continued efforts to keep r,',age costs down on
the whofe in the private sector; it shou[d however be pursued cautiously in 1983,
to as avoid that the Netherlands economy, aLready suffering from the conse-
quences of the worLd economic sLowdown, would be affected in the near future
by an excess'ivety weak overaLL demand.
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In the UniteC Kingdom there t.ras a smalL increase in GDP in 1982
'in contrast to the falLs in activjty in the previous two years. A further
marked falL in the rate of inftat'ion has taken place with the annuaL increase
i:r consumen prices approaching 7 % by the end of the year. UnempLoyment
has howe,rer 6ontinued to grow whiLe the surpLus on the baLance of payments
position has decLined considerabLy. NevertheLess a substantiaL surpLus is
stilL LikeLy to be recorded for the year as a whoLe.
Despite some stnengthening in the recovery in the coming year, the
rate of gro!,,th is Likely to remain very m'cdest in 1983, perhaps 1 112 % and
uneinployment is expected to continue rising aLbeit at a sLower pace. Lower
wage sett Lements couLd Lead to a further substantial reduction in the rate
of inflation (towards 5 7, at the end of 1983).
The UK, Like aLL other Commun'ity countries, faces severe jmbalances
in the Labouir market. In rnany othen nespects however the UK economyrs reLative
position has improved cons iderabLy, nefLecting the combined effects of the
devetopment of oiL resources and adherence to tight financiaL policies.
The rate of infLation is now welL beLow the Community average and decLin'ing,
the public sector deficit both in absoLute terms and as a percentage of GDP
has faLLen markedLy whi Lst the baLance of payments po:i'ition, although it has
weakened:umewhat, is stiLL very fa'rourabLe" The depth of the recession has
enccuraged companies to shecj a considerabLe amount of Labour whicir has been
refLected jn very Large pnoductivity ga"ins. fhese in turn Led to very Low
irrcreases in un'it Labour costs in the UK revers'i ng some of the Loss in
competit'iveness associatecl with the appreciation of, steri-'ing'in 1979 ancJ 1980.
For the financiaL year 1982-83, thene shouLd apparentLy be no difficuLty
in keeping pubLic sector borrowing beLow the LeveLs set out in the most necent
Medium Term FinanciaL Strategy (MTFS) G 1/2 % of GDP). The monetary growth tarEet
nange was adjusted upwar'ds compared to the on'iginaL intentionsnand this range now
applies to a number of measures of money suppLy. OveraLL the present stance
of fiscaL and monetary poLicy must be consjdened a cautious one, which
shoui.d be conducive to a further decLine in infLationary pressures and to
faLLs in interest rates.
46 --
The outLook for gnowth and empLoyment in 1983 is stiLL unsat'isfactory
and in considering pLans for economic poLicy for 1983-84 it is desirabLe
to ensure that gains made in the pubLic sector financiaL positiono iri
reduc'ing'infLation and in ra'ising productivity Levels are transLated into a
more satisfactory overaLL economic penformance. Given the speed at r,rhich
the rate of infLation is improving" and noting that the underly'ing rate is
aLready weLL beLow that for the Community as a whole, then the thrust of
monetary and fiscaL poIicy, whiLst being directed towards ensuring a further
neduct'ion in inflation, shouLd be designed to contribute to the recovery in
a ct'iv i ty .
0n the monetary side the main emphasis should therefore be on a
steady expansion of the monetary aggregates consistent with a pick"up
in activity. There'is a case fon ensuring that the growth of the monetary
aggregates in 1983-84 remains at the top end of tlre pubLished target range
of 7-11 %. A degree of lending to the private sector sufficient tc benefit
sign'ificantLy investment and stockbui Lding, consistent with downward moving
Longer-term interest rates, can be achieved within this framework given the
foreseeabLe trends in pubLic finance.
Although the authorities have made it cLear in the most recent MTFS
that they wish to see a further reduction in the s'ize of the pubLic sector
deficit, the present outLook for pubLic sector borrowing in 1985-84 is now
favourabLe so that there shouLd be room for manoeuvre in fiscaL policy in
order to ensure that the financiaL framework, now that infLation is receding,
is sufficientLy w'ide to aid an upturn in activity. 0n the basis of the
present outLcok, a target for the pubLic sector borrowing requirement for
1983-84, somewhat above the itLustrative pubLished figure of UKL 8,5 b'iLLion
Q 3/4 % of GDP) would seem appropriate. The way in which the roorn for
manoeuvre is exploited wouLd depend partLy on the evoLution of the UKrs
external position, and shou[d take account of the need to improve the
empLoyment and suppLy potentiaL of the econony, for exampLe through a
reduction in the nationaL insurance surcharge or increased pubLic sector
spendinE on construction activities. However, in the near futt.tre, an
extension of the specific poLicies aLready in pLace to deaL with
unempLoyment couLd be required.
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GDP
va Lue
g roHt h
GDP
volumc
growlb
Risc in
coNumclpn6
Currtnt
8munt
of bdmcc
of goyarcnc
Gcaanl
lommcnt
balaffc
Moncy
rupply
IrowtlM2t
pri ce
def Lator
Coopcasrtion
PCT
mploycc
o/2 %GDP %cDP
1 961 -1 970
1971-1980
1 980
1 e81
1982(1)
1983(1)
10 rz
1314
1219
'12 tO
13,7
11r0
516 4r4
316 9 15
113 11.5
0,3 11 ,7
1,1 12,4
1 rO 9r7
413
915
13r2
1215
11rO
819
9"4
13,8
14,6
14 ,8
1?rz
915
12r7
14 rg
917
1115
12,5
1?rO
0rg
3rB
614
713
813
913
QrZ Or4
-or4 -or1
-114
-2rO -115
-?,6 -3r0
-1rg -3rO
Prcliminary cstimatc of thc Commision snic on thc basis of prcsent or anticipatcd policics.
Z, ciaDgc ovcr prcviou pcriod. auual ratc,Eto ot ycat.
5L,
Table 10
IreLand: maln economic rggregrtes, 19 61 - 1983
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of paynrcoit
Gcncral
gowrnmmt
bd'@volumc pfi Ceson4n def Lator
Morcy
suppll
growln
M2'
o/2 72 %GDP %GDP
1 961 -1 970
1 971 -1 980
1 980
1 981
1982(1)
1983(l)
919
18,3
17n
19,0
2116
15,4
412
411
216
111
2r0
2r4
515
13 16
14 ,0
17,8
19,2
12,7
416
13,8
1813
?0,4
18,5
13 r0
10,4
1R q
16 19
17 ,4
'tA I
16,5
1<
7r4
R?
1n i
1? 11
14,0
g 
,g -2,3 -2,7
1 8,0 -4,6 -8,1
19 ,7 -8,4 '12,8
19,A -13,2 -15,4
14,1 -9 ,O -11 ,7
11,1 '7,6 -14,4
Flj.ioary cltimaE of thc Comnirsioo rruiq on the brlis of pr€rcnt or enticipatcd policicr.
I c.ha98e ovcr prcvrour pcriod, lDnual ratc.no ot ytar.
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Table
Ita t.y
11
rraln economlc aggregotes, l%183
GDP
va Lue
g rort h
pri ce
def Lator
GDP
Yolumc
growth
Rirc ia
conSw
pries
co{rDantrtion
-rpbH
Curreat
tooou!l
ofbdru
of Fldcnu
Gncrrl
lo$f,nmcDtbdllcc
ruppfy
ttowln
-M2 l
1961-"r970
197',1-1980
1 980
1 eE1
1982(1)
1983(1)
5r7 4r5
3r1 14 17
4,0 2Or4
-0,2 17,6
0,8 17,5
1r0 1517
1Or7 1rE
1814 
-Or?
2?rO -215
2?,0 -2,3
1812 
-113
't7 r7 -0r5
10 15
1813
?5 r1
17 ,4
18,4
16,9
318
14 ,6
20,4
19 rO
1616
1 5r0
'213
-8r0
'E14
-11 r9
-11.6
-1lrO
13.3
19 15
1?ro
16rO
75 18
16rz
512
6rO
8r0
8rg
919
10,5
Ptclimrnary arinatc of tbc Comision *rvica m tbc bris of prcomt or mticiprtad polici,6-
I ctrngc owr prcviou pcriod, mud rrtc.lnd ol y4r.
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Table 12
Lr:xenbourg : maln economlc aggregstes, 1961-33
GDP
va Lue
groHth
cDp GDP Ri* in Compcnration curcnt
volumc p ri c e coNumcr Dcr lsuDl;;.;d i"ii"a". priar mprovc "f"j"ff*
Moo€y
rupply
ttowrnM2J
Gcncral
gowmmmt
brlare
%cDP
- 
%2 yl %GDp
1 961 -1 970
1 971 -1 980
198r1
I 981
1982(1)
1983(l)
7 16 3'5
9r5 3'o
7 t5 or7
2r5 
-2r4
8r4 4r3
8r8 1ro
3'9
5'3
6'8
5rO
B'7
7 r'l
2r5
6r7
7rT
8r1
11r0
9ro
+1,6
+2rA
-1r8
{r8
{t9
-1ro
orl
o'J
o'7
Iro
r12
1r3
6rT + ?rl
1Or5 +18r5
8r2 +2218
7 r7 2O'3
612 r9r7
9ro 1818
hclimiaary cstimatc of thc Combiion scnis on thc basis of prcccnt or aaticipatcd policicr.
f, c.halgc owr prcviou pcriod, uual ratc.
EtrO Ol !qr.
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Table 13
l{etherland.s : maln ecomndc rggcgatcr $d.{3
GDP
va tue
groHt h
GDP
volumc
gowth
Curcot
tooouor
of hLra
of F"a.nt!
Gc!€rd
to'3mtFrt
bdrocc
tupp{y
ltow!!M2J
price
def Iator
Rilc io Coqcoratro!@s8utrtf Frpriccr cnPbYGr
tor6
IotT
5r9
414
5'6
3'3
512
218
or5
-1r l
4t5
-or3
5r2
716
5'3
516
5rI
315
4tl
7r7
616
615
6r3
415
4t9
-114
-3t4
4t5
-5n?
-5'5
9rI
10r8
3r6
J12
716
?tO
o19
314
4r7
7'5
1ot4
13, I
)12 %2 %Gw %GDP
1 961-1 970
1 971 -1 980
1 984
1 eEl
1982(t)
1 983(l )
lor5 oro
lOr? +113
516 -I14
3r3 2r3
5'6 4'o
3,3 5rO
-l
I
hcliEio.ry catimalc of th3 Comnirdon rrvicct on rhc bais of 9rcr.nt ot rDticigatcd golicicr.
l, cira3r ovcr prwiou Fio4 sud nL.loo ol F8r.
;6.
Table 14
Uni ted Ki ngdom : main economlc rggregates' 1961-1983
er\c, oo* -EF-- Rircin comp.ffstion cur*nl Gcnqal YgTl u"ttjg*)mploydin lebourGDP
va Lue
g roHt h
GDP
"ol,*" pf i Ce oBumq Dcr smut tomilGnS 
supply
ie ofbrbncc balrc gtowtn focFffi iiiil,". prica cnprovcc "r'j"brffi rancc sfril
1961-1970
1971-1980
1 980
1 e81
198?(1)
1983(l)
712
16,0
17 12
919
911
8r2
218
119
'1 14
-119
016
117
412
13 19
18,9
12,1
814
614
-nn
-0 17
1rZ
214
0r8
-o,?
4r0 7,1
13,3 16,2
15 ,5 20,9
10,9 13,6
8,8 9,4
6,9 8r4
-0,7 5r9 1,9
-3 o2 14,5 4r4
-3,5 18,6 6,9
-2,1 14,6 1Ot6
-0 19 10 12 12,2
.0,5 1A 11 12 15
I hclininary cstimarc ofthc Conmision scryiccr on thc basis ofprcrcnt or anticipatcd policicc.| %chaarc oyer prcviou! 6riod, amual ratc.
SterLing M3
In 1g7g and 1gg0 the statistics concerning the money suppLy are distorted by the existence
of the rcorsetr controls and by their suppression in mid-1980. rf these distorsions are
corrected the growth rate would be about 14,6 % in 1979 and in 1980 '
Note : F'igures up to 198C.are on an ESA basis unLess otherwise stated'
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ProposaI for a
COUNCIL DECISION
adopting the annuaL report on the economic situation in the Comm,rnity and
taying dorn economic poLicy guide[ines for 1983
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COI{I{.'NITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty estabtishing the European Economic Commrnity,
Having regard to CountiI Decision 7411?:O|EEC of 18 February 1974 on the
attainment of a high degree convergence of the economic poticies of the
frlember States of the European Economic Comrrunity (1), as amended by Deci-
sion 75l787lEEC (2), and in particutar Articte 4 thereof,
Having regard to the proposaL from the Commission,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (3),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Conmittee (4),
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION :
Articte 1
The CounciL hereby adopts the annuaL report on the economic situation in
the Comrunity, contained in sectjons 1 and 2 of the part I of the annexed
draft Report, and tays down the guidetines to be fottored by the ltlember
States in economic poticy for 1983t as contained in sections 5 and 1-r$'-
part I and part II of the annexed draft Report-
Articte
This Decision is adressed to the llember States.
Done at Brussets, 1982
For the Counci t
The President
5
(1) 0J No L 63r5.3.1974,p.16 
.. :
?(2) OJ No L 330, 24.12.1975'p.52 '1. ,.'. .(i)oJlto f '.tJ ;
